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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal of a final order in a formal adjudicative proceeding before the 
Public Service Commission of Utah ("Commission"). The Utah Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(e)(i) as this is a 
Petition for Review of the final order of the Commission. On June 16, 2016, the Utah 
Supreme Court issued an Order transferring this matter over to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-103(2)G). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did the Commission err when it determined that Carbon/Emery was 
required to present all empirical evidence on the cost of equity in its direct 
testimony? 
Standard of Review: This is an error of law reviewed for correction. A party is 
permitted to introduce relevant rebuttal testimony, and the Commission's determination 
that Carbon/Emery's failure to present certain evidence in its direct testimony amounted 
to a failure to present evidence to support its requested cost of equity is an erroneous 
conclusion of law. Questions of law are subject to a non-deferential review for 
correctness. Ellis-Hall Consultants v. Public Service Commission, 2016 UT 34, 379 P.3d 
1270. 
Issue Preserved in the Record: Carbon/Emery preserved the issue of whether 
Carbon/Emery presented empirical evidence on the cost of equity in its Petition for 
Review, Rehearing, or Reconsideration. R. Vol. 2, 1937-1941. In the Commission's 
Order on Petition for Review, Rehearing, and Reconsideration, the Commission indicated 
that if Carbon/Emery wanted the Commission to rely on its evidence presented by 
Douglas Meredith, related to cost of equity, it should have presented such testimony in its 
direct testimony. R. 2942-2943. Because this issue was initially raised by the 
Commission's Order on Reconsideration, this Appeal/Petition for Review is the first 
opportunity Carbon/Emery has had procedurally to address this Commission 
determination. 
2. Did the Commission err in imputing a hypothetical capital structure of 
• 43. 79% debt and 56.21 % equity to Carbon/Emery where Carbon/Emery has no 
debt, and the imputation of such capital structure is contrary to its prior practice, 
and otherwise arbitrary and capricious? 
~ Standard of Review: The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) governs 
review of Carbon/Emery's claim on appeal. See Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403. This 
section provides that the procedures for agency action are applicable to all agency actions 
and adjudicative proceedings on or after January 1, 1988. Moreover,§ 63G-4-403 of the 
Utah Code sets forth the types of agency actions for which appellate courts may grant 
relief, but does not expressly mandate the standard of review the court must employ when 
reviewing these decisions. See Murray v. Labor Comm 'n, 2013 UT 38, ,r 18, 308 P.3d 
461,468. Some of these provisions, however, do imply a standard of review such as 
subsections (g) and (h)(i), (h)(iii), (h)(iv). Id., 2013 UT 38, ,r 19, 308 P.3d at 468. Utah 
Code § 63G-4-403 reads: 
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(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is 
based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
( c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
( d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making 
process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(t) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary and capricious. 
The standard of review under Sections 63G-4-403(4)(h)(i), (h)(iii), and (h)(iv) is 
the substantial evidence standard which provides that the finding of the Commission will 
be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. 
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Issue Preserved in the Record: Carbon/Emery preserved this issue in its Post-
i Hearing Closing Argument, and in its Petition for Review, Rehearing and 
Reconsideration. See R. Vol. 2, 1941-1943. 
3. Did the Commission err in determining the appropriate depreciation 
expense for Carbon/Emery during the test period? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves two standards of review. 
The court must review if the Commission abused its discretion in determining the 
depreciation expense adjustment. The Commission has been granted discretion to 
determine public utilities depreciation rates and accounts. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-24. 
Although the Commission has the discretion to determine an appropriate depreciation 
expense for Carbon/Emery in the test year, it must do so in conformity with the 
fundamental goal of rate making to select a test year and adjust it for known and 
@ measurable changes such that it reasonably approximates the rate-effective period. See 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission, 861 P.2d 414,422 (Utah 1993). 
The determination of whether the test year as adjusted by the Commission 
reasonably approximates the rate effective period is a question of fact which will be 
upheld if supported by "substantial evidence based on the record as a whole." Resort 
Retainers v. Labor Comm 'n, 2010 UT App 229, ~ 13,238 P.3d 1081, 1084. If there is 
not substantial evidence to support the finding that the test year, as adjusted, reasonably 
approximates the rate-effective period, the Commission will have abused its discretion in 
determining the depreciation expense adjustment for the test period. 
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Issue Preserved in the Record: Carbon/Emery preserved this issue in its Post-
Hearing Closing Brief and in its Petition for Review, Rehearing and Reconsideration. 
See R. Vol. 2, 1946-1953. 
4. Did the Commission fail to determine whether Carbon/Emery's 
selection of the group method of accounting was imprudent when the decision was 
made? 
Standard of Review: Under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4( 4 ): 
If in the Commission's determination of just, reasonable or sufficient rates, the 
Commission considers the prudence of an action taken by a public utility, or an 
expense incurred by a public utility, the Commission shall apply the following 
standard in making its prudence determination: 
(i) Ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail ratepayers of the public utility 
in this state; 
(ii) focus on the reasonableness of the expense resulting from the action of the 
public utility judged as of the time the action was taken; 
(iii) determine whether a reasonable utility, knowing what the utility knew or 
reasonably should have known at the time of the action, would reasonably 
have incurred all or some portion of the expense, in taking the same or 
some other prudent action. 
Failure to comply with the statute is an erroneous interpretation of the law under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403( d). Questions of law are subject to a non-deferential 
review for correctness. Ellis-Hall, 2016 UT 34, 379 P.3d 1270. 
Issue Preserved in the Record: Carbon/Emery preserved this issue in its Post .. 
Hearing Closing Brief and in its Petition for Review, Rehearing and Reconsideration. 
See R. 2712; R. Vol. 2, 1955-1956. 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
All relevant statutes and rules pertinent to the issues before the Court are 
contained in the body of the brief. Determinative provisions include Utah Code Ann. § 
54-4-4; Utah Code Ann.§ 54-7-12.1; Utah Code Ann.§ 54-8b-15; Utah Code Ann§ 
63G-4-206; Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403; and Utah Admin. Code§ R746-360-6. 
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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Carbon/Emery is a rural rate of return regulated incumbent telephone corporation 
that provides telecommunications services in Carbon County, Utah. As an incumbent 
telephone corporation designated an "eligible telecommunications carrier" pursuant to 4 7 
U.S.C. § 214(e), Carbon/Emery is entitled to receive Utah Universal Service Fund 
("UUSF") Support pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15 and Utah Admin. Code § 
R746-360-6. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In March of 2015, Carbon/Emery determined that its revenues from all sources fell 
short of its reasonable costs to provide basic phone service plus a reasonable return on 
investment. In other words, Carbon/Emery, a regulated rate of return telecommunications 
company, was under-earning as a regulated public utility. Carbon/Emery prepared and 
filed an Application for Increase in UUSF Distribution seeking an increase of $563,262 
in annual support from the UUSF. Carbon/Emery filed testimony in support of its 
Application. Carbon/Emery amended its application on April 2, 2015 and amended its 
testimony in support thereof, requesting an increase in UUSF support of $816,909 
("Amended Application"). 
In prosecuting Carbon/Emery's Application, the Utah Public Service Commission 
("Commission") was charged with determining whether Carbon/Emery is entitled to 
additional UUSF disbursements. The factors to be determined by the Commission in 
determining the UUSF eligibility and amount are set forth in Utah Code and Commission 
7 •• 
Rules. Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15 establishes the Utah Universal Service Fund 
t, ("UUSF"). Eligibility for disbursements under the UUSF for rate of return incumbent 
telephone corporations such as Carbon/Emery is determined under rules promulgated by 
the Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 54-8b-15(3) and found in Utah Admin. 
Code§ R746-360-6(2)(b) which provides: 
• 
• 
• 
Rate of return Incumbent telephone corporations shall complete a 
Commission review of their revenue requirement and public 
telecommunications services' rate structure prior to any change in their 
USF distribution which differs from a prior USF distribution. 
Utah Admin. Code R746-360-6(2)(b). 
In addition, section R746-360-8 provides the method of calculating fund 
distributions for rate of return incumbent telephone corporations: 
Monies from the fund will equal the numerical difference between the 
Incumbent telephone corporation's total embedded costs of providing 
public telecommunications services, for a designated support area, less the 
product of the Incumbent telephone corporation's Average Revenue Per 
Line, for the designated support area, times the Incumbent telephone 
corporation's active access lines in the designated support area. "Total 
embedded costs" shall include a weighted average rate of return on capital 
of the intrastate and interstate jurisdictions. 
In many instances, an application for UUSF Distribution will be made in 
conjunction with an application for rate increase made under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4. 
In this case, however, at the time of Carbon/Emery's Application, Carbon/Emery's rates 
were already at the Commission approved affordable base rate of $16.50 and $26.00 for 
residential and commercial service. As a result, Carbon/Emery's Application for UUSF 
Increase was not a rate case. However, to determine Carbon/Emery's eligibility for 
UUSF disbursements, the Commission was required to review Carbon/Emery's revenue 
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requirement, including total embedded costs, average revenue per line, and return on 
capital, as it would in a rate case. Therefore, the statutes governing the determination of 
just and reasonable rates are instructive for the calculation of UUSF disbursements. 
In this case, Carbon/Emery identified an historical test period of January 1, 2014 
through December 31, 2014 in its Application, adjusted for known and measurable 
changes as permitted by Utah Code Ann.§ 54-4-4(3)(b). 
As is the practice before the Commission, Carbon/Emery, the Division of Public 
Utilities ("Division"), the Office of Consumer Services ("Office"), and the Utah Rural 
Telecom Association ("URTA")1 pre-filed written testimony in this proceeding. 
Carbon/Emery Chief Executive Officer, Brock Johansen, and Chief Financial Officer, 
Darren Woolsey, filed testimony in support of the Amended Application 
contemporaneously with the filing of the Amended Application on April 2, 2015. R. 44-
65; R. Vol. 1, 178-355. On April 24, 2015, Carbon/Emery filed Supplemental Direct 
Testimony of Darren Woolsey. R. 71-73; R. Vol. 1, 356-358. After the Amended 
Application was filed, the Commission held a Scheduling Conference and issued a 
scheduling order which contemplated that direct, rebuttal, and surrebuttal testimony 
would be pre-filed in advance of the hearing. R. 79-85. Specifically, the Scheduling 
Order in this case provided as follows: 
Parties' Direct Testimony, other than Company Friday, August 21, 2015 
Requests for Intervention Friday, August 28, 2015 
1 UR TA is not a party to this appeal. 
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Parties' Rebuttal Testimony Friday, September 4, 2015 
Parties' Surrebuttal Testimony Friday, September 18, 2015 
R. 79-85. 
The following Testimony was filed by the Parties in advance of the hearing2: 
Date Party Testimony Record 
April 2, 2015 Carbon/Emery Amended Direct -Brock Johansen R. 44-51 
R. Vol. 1, 178-187 
Amended Direct - Darren Woolsey R. 52-65 
R. Vol. 1, 188-355 
April 24, 2015 Carbon/Emery Supplemental Direct - Woolsey R. 71-73 
R. Vol. 1, 356-358 
August 21, Division Direct - Joseph Hellewell R. 141-151 
2015 R. Vol. 1, 359-395 
Direct - William Duncan R. 153-156 
R. Vol. 1, 3 96-402 
Direct - Casey Coleman R.158-171 
August 21, Office Direct - David Brevitz R. 203-224 
2015 R. Vol. 1, 403-431 
Direct - Bion Ostrander R. 1871-1924 
R. Vol. 1, 514-527 
R. Vol. 1, 129-194 
September 4, Carbon/Emery Rebuttal - Woolsey R. Vol. 2, 1-58; 118-
2015 128 
Rebuttal - Douglas Meredith R. 1590-1870 
September 4, Division Rebuttal - Hellewell R. 336-338 
2015 Rebuttal - Duncan R. 1437-1442 
September 4, Office Rebuttal- Brevitz R. Vol. 1, 1070-1085 
2015 
September 18, Carbon/Emery Surrebuttal - Meredith R. 1135-1145 
2015 Surrebuttal - Woolsey R. 1146-1147 
September 18, Division Surrebuttal - Hellewell R. 816-826 
2015 
Surrebuttal - Duncan R. 828-833 
2 The table reflects the testimony and the record pursuant to the Joint Motion of the 
Parties filed on September 18, 2015 (R. 1130-1134), and the Stipulation to Clarify the 
~ Record filed by the Public Service Commission with the Utah Court of Appeals on 
January 5, 2017. 
~ 10 
R. Vol. 1, 2329-2336 
Surrebuttal - Coleman R. 836-870 
September 18, Office Surrebuttal - Brevitz R. 871-1055 
2015 R. Vol. 1, 2337-2372 
Surrebuttal - Ostrander R. 1927-1966 
R. Vol. 1, 2414-2475 
R. Vol. 2, 265-304 
December 18, Carbon/Emery Sur-surrebuttal - Woolsey R. 1989-2008 
2015 R. Vol. 2, 354-763 
January 15, Division Sur-surrebuttal - Hellewell R. 2010-2019 
2016 R. Vol. 2, 764-790 
In the process of filing pre-hearing testimony, Carbon/Emery discovered four 
known and measurable changes to its test year period, which reduced Carbon/Emery's 
requested annual UUSF support to $570,643. R. Vol. 2, p. 117. 
A hearing in this matter was held before the Commission on January 26 and 27, 
2016. All pre-filed testimony was admitted into the record without objection. R. Vol. 2, 
p. 998 at p. 9. The Commission ordered closing arguments to be provided in written form 
by the parties, Post-Hearing. All parties filed their Post-Hearing Closing Arguments on 
. March 2, 2016. 
The Office made several errors in its written Closing Argument, which it 
attempted to correct with an Errata Sheet filed on March 7, 2016. Carbon/Emery 
objected to the Office's Errata Sheet because it contained "corrections" that were not 
supported by the evidence in the record. Closing Argument Replies were filed by the 
parties on March 9, 2016. No other objections to the Closing Arguments were filed. 
III. DISPOSITION 
The Commission found that Carbon demonstrated that its regulated revenues from 
all sources in the test period (revenues received from the provision of services in both the 
11 
interstate and intrastate jurisdictions, all revenues derived from providing network 
(i elements, services, functionalities, and all support funds received from the Federal 
Universal Service Support Fund) did not cover its reasonable costs of providing basic 
telephone service plus a reasonable rate of return in the test period, and that 
Carbon/Emery was entitled to some level of UUSF support. However, in the 
Commission's March 31, 2016 Order, the Commission determined that Carbon/Emery 
was not entitled to an increase in its UUSF support. R. Vol. 2, 1900. Rather, the 
Commission determined that Carbon/Emery's current UUSF support should be reduced 
by $152,645.70 annually per year through December 31, 2019, and a further annual 
(i reduction of $185,546.64 beginning on January 1, 2020, in the absence of a prior 
demonstration by Carbon/Emery that the decrease is no longer warranted. Id. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission made several errors, and 
Carbon/Emery seeks review of the Commission's determination of the amount of UUSF 
to which the Commission determined Carbon/Emery was entitled. Carbon/Emery filed a 
Petition for Review, Rehearing, and Reconsideration with the Public Service Commission 
on April 29, 2016. R. 2879-2908; R. Vol. 2, 1930-1959. On May 19, 2016, the 
Commission entered an Order denying the Petition for Review addressing the issues 
raised by Carbon/Emery. R. 2936-2959. Carbon/Emery filed its Notice of Appeal with 
the Utah Supreme Court on June 16, 2016. Carbon/Emery's Appeal was transferred to 
this Court. 
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IV. STATEMENT OFF ACTS 
1. Carbon/Emery is a telephone corporation qualified to do business in Utah. 
Carbon/Emery operates as a location exchange carrier providing telecommunications 
services in the state of Utah under authority issued to Carbon/Emery by the Commission. 
R. 38. 
2. Carbon/Emery has been designated an "eligible telecommunications 
carrier" pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 214(e). R. 38. 
3. At the time of the filing of its Amended Application, Carbon/Emery's rates 
for services were at the Commission approved affordable base rate. R. 40. 
4. Carbon/Emery, by its Amended Application, seeks an increase in UUSF 
support. R. 38. 
5. Carbon/Emery's request for UUSF supp01i was calculated based on a 2014 
historical test year. R. Vol. 2, 1905. 
6. Carbon/Emery provides both intrastate and interstate services with-% 
of Carbon/Emery's operations intrastate, and-% of its operations are interstate. R. 
Vol. 2, 1906. 
7. During the test period, Carbon/Emery had no debt. R. Vol. 2, 1906. The 
Commission adopted a cost of debt of 5.636%. R. Vol. 2, 1908. 
8. Carbon/Emery participates in one of the National Exchange Carriers 
Associations (NECA) common line services costs pools. The September 30, 2014 NECA 
form 492 reports this cost pool's earned rate of return at 11.45%. R. Vol. 2, p. 1906. 
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This is the rate that was used in Carbon/Emery' s rate of return calculation for interstate 
• purposes. R. Vol. 2, p 1914. 
9. Carbon/Emery' s application requested a return on equity of 12.13% and an 
imputation of a hypothetical capital structure of 65% equity and 35% debt. R. 39. 
10. The Division also proposed use of a hypothetical capital structure of 65% 
equity and 35% debt and a cost of equity of 10.75%. R. 161, 164. 
11. Initially the Division suggested an interstate rate of return of 9 .4%, but 
• 
ultimately, the Division revised its calculation and utilized an interstate rate of return of 
11.45%, consistent with Carbon/Emery' s calculation. R. 166, 839. This resulted in a 
• Division supported overall rate of return of 9.85%. R. 867. Finally, at the hearing, the 
Division further corrected its pre-filed testimony by revising the Division's recommended 
overall rate of return to 9.97%. R. Vol. 2, p. 998 at p. 168:7-169:15 . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
12. The Office proposed use of a 50/50 hypothetical capital structure. R. Vol. 2, 
315; R. 1979. The Office proposed a cost of equity of 10%. R. Vol. 2, 322. Finally, the 
Office suggested the appropriate interstate rate of return was 9 .4%, for an overall rate of 
return of 8.45%. R. Vol. 2, 315, 317, 323. This was amended at the hearing due to an 
e1Tor in the interstate/intrastate separations and the Office corrected its overall rate of 
return to 8.46%. R. 2700 at p. 250 . 
13. Carbon/Emery' s application included a depreciation expense of-. 
R. Vol.I , 203 . 
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14. Carbon/Emery employs a group method of depreciation which applies the 
Commission ordered depreciation rates to the appropriate group accounts using a 
straight-line method. R. Vol. 2, 40-41; R. 596-624. 
15. The Division proposed a depreciation expense of for the test 
year (adjustment to the test year of-) using the single asset straight-line method 
of depreciation. R. Vol. 1, 361, 366; R. Vol. 2, 773. 
16. The Division, in its testimony, identified five appropriate methods of 
depreciation: single asset Single Asset Straight Line; Straight Line Vintage Group 
Depreciation; Net Book Value Group Depreciation; Depreciation Studies; or the FCC 
Method. R. Vol. 1, 367-368. 
17. With regard to the FCC Method identified by Mr. Hellewell, he stated: 
The FCC has developed a formula that has been used to recalculate the 
depreciation rate based on the plants average remaining life, future net salvage, 
and depreciation reserve ratio. This formula has been published in several orders. 
(FCC 00-306, FCC 96-485) From FCC 00-306, "The depreciation rate for an 
account is a function of the associated plant's average remaining life, future net 
salvage, and depreciation reserve ratio. The depreciation rate is calculated using 
the following formula: 
Depreciation Rate = 100% - Accumulated Depreciation % - Future Net Salvage % 
Average Remaining Life 
Both the average remaining life and the future net salvage factors are based upon 
estimates that require periodic review to ensure their reasonableness." 
R. Vol. 1, 368. 
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18. The Division calculated the depreciation expense using the Vintage Group 
method as (adjustment to the test year in the amount of 
Vol. 2, 773. 
19. Carbon/Emery calculated the depreciation expense using the FCC Method 
of depreciation, which resulted in a test year depreciation expense of between -
and - depending on whether a mid-year convention or year-end calculation was 
used. R. Vol. 2, 370. 
20. A hearing in this matter was held before the Commission on January 26 and 
27, 2016. All pre-filed testimony was admitted into the record without objection. R. Vol. 
2, 998 at p. 9. 
21. The Commission ordered closing arguments to be provided in written form 
by the parties, post-hearing. R. Vol. 2, 2700 at p. 314. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the Public Service Commission's Order on 
Motion for Review, Rehearing and Reconsideration, and remand to the Public Service 
Commission. The Commission erroneously concluded that the evidence offered by 
Carbon/Emery's expert in Rebuttal Testimony was not properly subjected to the 
adversarial process because it was offered in rebuttal, rather than in Carbon/Emery's 
direct testimony, and was thus, not considered empirical evidence offered in support of 
Carbon/Emery's cost of equity, and rate of return calculation. This incorrect legal 
conclusion should be reversed, and the Commission should be directed to properly 
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consider all the admitted evidence. Similarly, the Commission made certain procedural 
legal errors when it determined that Carbon/Emery had not properly preserved certain 
issues that were raised in the Post-Hearing Closing Argument. The Commission's 
determination that Carbon/Emery's raising of these issues was "untimely" should be 
reversed. 
Additionally, the capital structure imputed to Carbon/Emery, also used in the rate 
of return calculation, is arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial 
evidence. The determination does not enunciate any methodology or standard that could 
be duplicated in future proceedings (even proceedings limited to Carbon/Emery). 
Further, the capital structure determination was made contrary to existing Commission 
policy, without adequate facts and reasons given for the departure. As a result, the 
Commission's determination of the imputed capital structure was unfair and irrational, 
and should be reversed and remanded to the Commission. 
Finally, the determination of the depreciation expense adjustment is contrary to the 
fundamental ratemaking goal which requires that the adjusted test year reasonably 
approximate the test period. In this case, the finding that the test year reasonably 
approximates the test period is not supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the 
Commission abused its discretion in determining the depreciation expense adjustment. 
The Commission further erred by failing to judge the prudence of Carbon/Emery's use of 
the group method of accounting at the time the decision was made, as required by Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-4-4( 4 ). 
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1. 
ARGUMENTS 
The Commission Erred When It Determined That Carbon/Emery Was 
Required To Present All Empirical Evidence On The Cost Of Equity In Its 
Direct Testimony. 
In its Amended Application, Carbon/Emery proposes the use of an overall rate of 
return of 10.50%. R. 59. This composite rate was derived using theoretical capital 
structure of 65% equity and 35% debt, a state cost of equity of 12.13%, a state return on 
debt of 5.636%, and interstate rate of return of 11.45%, derived from NECA's Form 492 
filing with the FCC on September 30, 2014 for calendar year 2013 pool participants. R. 
59-60. According to the Direct Testimony of Darren Woolsey, Carbon/Emery requested 
12.13% cost of equity to "mirror the cost of equity used and approved by the Commission 
in other recent USF proceedings." R. 60-61. Mr. Woolsey's Amended Direct Testimony 
was filed with the Amended Application on April 2, 2015. 
Four months later, on August 21, 2015, the Division filed the Direct Testimony of 
William Duncan and the Direct Testimony of Casey Coleman. Similarly, on August 21, 
2015, the Office of Consumer Services presented the Direct Testimony of Bion Ostrander 
and David Brevitz. Pursuant to standard Commission procedure, this was the first-time 
Carbon/Emery was made aware of the formal positions of the Division and the Office and 
the "contested issues" in the case. 
In their pre-filed direct testimony, the Office and the Division took issue with 
Carbon/Emery's rate of return, and filed testimony on what each believed the overall rate 
of return should be. R. 166; R. Vol. 2, 311. In particular, the Division's witness, Casey 
Coleman utilized a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to establish the cost of equity at 
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10.75%, utilizing a capital structure of 65% equity and 35% debt, and an interstate rate of 
return of 9.4%, resulting in an overall rate of return of 9.12%. R. 161, 164, 166. In Casey 
Coleman's surrebuttal testimony, he revised his calculation and utilized an interstate rate 
of return of 11 .45%, consistent with Carbon/Emery's calculation. R. 839. This resulted 
in a Division supported overall rate of return of 9.85%. R. 867. Finally, at the hearing, 
Casey Coleman further corrected his pre-filed testimony by revising the Division's 
recommended overall rate of return to 9.97%. R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 168:7-169:15. 
The Office's witness, David Brevitz, testified that several cases before the Kansas 
Corporation Commission, which resulted in a cost of equity of approximately 10%, 
provided a reasonable basis for the Commission to adopt a cost of equity of 10%. R. Vol. 
2, 322. Mr. Brevitz also recommended imputing a hypothetical capital structure of 50/50 
and an interstate rate of return of9.4%, for an overall rate of return of 8.45%. R. Vol. 2, 
315, 317, 323; R. 2700 at p. 250. 
To rebut these calculations, Carbon/Emery engaged its consultant, Douglas 
Meredith, to provide testimony further supporting the reasonableness of Carbon/Emery's 
requested cost of equity, and disputing the calculations of cost of equity provided by the 
Office and the Division. This testimony was filed as Rebuttal Testimony by Douglas 
Meredith on September 18, 2015. 
Mr. Meredith testified in pre-filed rebuttal testimony that Carbon/Emery's 
requested 12.13% return on equity was reasonable based on several factors. First, Mr. 
Meredith identified that Carbon/Emery's calculated overall rate of return was based on an 
overall rate of return that had been recently proposed by the Division and was used in 
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Carbon/Emery's affiliate Emery Telephone's Utah USF request finalized earlier in the 
year, and that Carbon/Emery assumed that since the Division had been comfortable with 
its proposed rate of return in January for an affiliate, the same rate of return should be 
used in the Carbon/Emery proceeding that was filed a few months later. R. 1594. 
Mr. Meredith further testified that if the rate of return were going to be at issue in 
this case, the Commission should consider a rate of return higher than Carbon/Emery's 
proposed 10.50%. R. 1596. However, Mr. Meredith also testified there was "more than 
enough evidence to support the 10.50% rate of return based on the information in this 
proceeding and filed at the Federal Communications Commission." R. 1596. Mr. 
Meredith then summarized FCC proceedings related to interstate rate of return which he 
testified supported Carbon/Emery's requested overall rate of return of 10.50% as just and 
reasonable. R. 1596-1598. 
Mr. Meredith also directly challenged Casey Coleman's CAPM analysis for 
determination of the appropriate and reasonable cost of equity, and provided substantial 
testimony refuting Mr. Coleman's model. R. 1598-1604. Specifically, of the 13 "peer 
group" companies chosen by Mr. Coleman, Mr. Meredith testified that 11 of the 
companies were not comparable, or were distressed companies not properly included in 
Mr. Coleman's CAPM. R. 1598-1599. Specifically, Mr. Meredith stated the following 
companies were not appropriately considered "comparable companies:" HickoryTech 
(should not be included because it was purchased by Consolidated Communications); 
Alteva (not comparable because the majority of its revenues are generated from VoIP and 
wireless); Atlantic Tele-Network (does not have ILEC operations; its primary wireline 
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operations are in Guyana; and a good portion of its revenues are generated from wireless 
operations); Earthlink (no ILEC operations); and IDT (no ILEC operations). R. 1598-
1599. Mr. Meredith further rejected Frontier, Windstream, Alaska Communications, 
Otelco, and New Ulm as comparable companies because they are distressed or in 
bankruptcy and have negative beta values using September 4, 2015 Yahoo! Finance 
reports (the same source used by Mr. Coleman). R. 1599. 
The Office witness David Brevitz also criticized the companies selected by Mr. 
Coleman for his CAPM calculation. R. Vol. 1, 1079-1082. Specifically, Mr. Brevitz 
identified seven of Mr. Coleman's "comparable companies" as inappropriate: Hickory 
Tech Corporation (should not be included because it is no longer in existence, so no 
public data is available for its operations); Atlantic Tele-Network (should not be included 
because it's not comparable to the U.S. wireline telephone business); Cincinnati Bell 
(should not be included as a comparable company since it serves a single large and 
compact metropolitan area and also operates very significant IT services, hardware and 
data center business, including "managed infrastructure services, IT and telephone 
equipment sales, and provisional IT staffing services); IDT Corporation (should not be 
included due to lack of comparability to the U.S. wireline telephone business); Alteva 
lri.c. (should not be included because company's operations and management appear to 
me to be very problematic); EarthLink Holdings (ELNK) (should not be included due to 
lack of comparability to the U.S. wireline telephony business); Fair Point 
Communications (FRP) (should not be included because the company has yet to earn a 
profit, and it is unclear if and when it may do so). R. Vol. 1, 1079-1082. 
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In addition to the substantial testimony related to the dissimilarities of the 
companies selected in the peer group, Mr. Meredith offered an alternate CAPM 
calculation to be considered by the Commission, and testimony on other methods of 
calculation of the cost of capital, including the free cash flow method proposed by 
NTCA. R. 1598-1605. Finally, Mr. Meredith provided evidence that Mr. Coleman's use 
of spot rates for the inputs in his CAPM is problematic because of the natural fluctuations 
in the market. R. 1600-1601. Mr. Meredith recommended using a trended rate, rather 
than spot rates. R. 1600. 
In short, Mr. Meredith provided extensive testimony in support of Carbon/Emery's 
cost of capital and rate of return proposed rates, and in rebuttal to the Division and the 
Office of Consumer Service's calculations. Mr. Meredith's rebuttal testimony was 
admitted into the record without objection. R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 9. 
After rebuttal testimony, all parties had the opportunity to pre-file surrebuttal and 
sur-surrebuttal testimony prior to the hearing. In fact, David Brevitz filed surrebuttal 
testimony directly addressing Douglas Meredith's Rebuttal Testimony on Rate of Return 
issues. R. Vol. 2, 2338. Similarly, Casey Coleman filed surrebuttal testimony directly 
addressing the rebuttal testimonies of Douglas Meredith and David Brevitz. R. 838. All 
of the surrebuttal and sur-surrebuttal testimony was admitted into the record without 
objection. R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 9. Finally, both the Division and the Office had the 
opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Meredith at the hearing. R. Vol. 2, 998 at pp. 115-137. 
Despite the fact that all adverse parties had the opportunity to respond to the Rebuttal 
Testimony of Douglas Meredith, and in fact, provided response to Douglas Meredith's 
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testimony in their Surrebuttal Testimony, and had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. 
Meredith at hearing, the Commission erroneously determined that "because 
Carbon/Emery did not present its testimony regarding the trended rate and the free cash 
flow methodology until rebuttal testimony, other parties did not have a full opportunity to 
rebut it." R. 2942. This conclusion is erroneous. 
The Commission further determined that Carbon/Emery's testimony on the 
trended rate and free cash flow methodologies for establishing the cost of capital could 
not be considered "unrebutted." R. 2942. The Commission did not, and could not, base 
this decision on a finding that Carbon/Emery's evidence on differing methodologies for 
determining the cost of capital was actually rebutted by the other parties. Rather, the 
Commission made the erroneous legal decision to "decline to consider Mr. Meredith's 
testimony as 'unrebutted"' and then declined to rely on Carbon/Emery's representations 
regarding what the return on equity would be if it were calculated in a different way from 
that recommended by the Division and the Office because the other parties did not have a 
full opportunity to rebut Carbon/Emery's testimony on this matter. R. 2942-2943. The 
Commission determined that the adverse parties' failure to present rebuttal testimony on 
certain issues raised by Mr. Meredith was due to the lack of opportunity. This is not 
correct as demonstrated by the fact that both adverse parties in fact filed surrebuttal 
testimony addressing much of Mr. Meredith's testimony. 
The Commission's goes on to state in its Order that: 
"it is incumbent upon the applicant to set forth the data and methodologies 
on which it asks the Commission to rely at a point in the proceeding where 
the adverse parties may offer rebuttal testimony from their experts. 
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Carbon/Emery failed to do so on the issue of return on equity, waiting until 
rebuttal to introduce testimony regarding data and methodologies that it 
considered persuasive." 
R. 2942-2943. 
Again, the Commission's conclusion that Carbon/Emery's evidence presented in 
rebuttal testimony was provided at a point where the adverse parties could not offer 
rebuttal testimony is a legal error which should be reviewed for correctness and reversed. 
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Commission's findings on this issue would 
require that an Applicant anticipate any and all potential legal arguments and positions 
that may be taken by the adverse parties, and address those issues in the Applicant's 
~ direct testimony. This would be an absurd result, particularly considering the procedures 
employed by the Commission in UUSF Applications. 
A. The Commission's Interpretation on Rebuttal Evidence is Contrary to 
Utah Admin Code§ R746-100-10. 
The Commission's interpretation on rebuttal evidence is contrary to Utah Admin. 
Code§ R746-100-10 which provides that the Commission is not bound by the technical 
I> rules of evidence and procedure. Utah Admin. Code §R 7 46-100-10 addresses "evidence" 
before the Commission and provides: 
The Commission is not bound by the technical rules of evidence and may 
receive any oral or documentary evidence; except that no finding may be 
predicated solely on hearsay or otherwise incompetent evidence. Further, 
the Commission may exclude non-probative, irrelevant, or unduly 
repetitious evidence. Testimony shall be under oath and subject to cross-
examination. 
See also Beehive Tel Co v. PSC of Utah, 2004 UT 18 if 58 n. 14, 89 P.3d 131, 147. 
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Carbon/Emery filed an application seeking relief from the Commission. In 
support of this application, the applicant offered direct testimony. In its application, 
Carbon/Emery proposed a rate of return of 10.5% based on its experience with the 
Division and the Commission in a UUSF application filed earlier that year. 
Carbon/Emery did not anticipate that its requested rate of return would be a contested 
issue since the Division had used the same rate of return in Carbon/Emery's affiliates 
case. Nevertheless, when it was, in fact, a contested issue, all parties had the opportunity 
to address, rebut, and contest the evidence through pre-filed written testimony, and 
through their witnesses at trial. The evidence submitted by Mr. Meredith was not 
objected to by any party, and was admitted into the record. The adverse parties had the 
opportunity to rebut the testimony and the Commission erred when it determined that 
Carbon/Emery's submission of the evidence in rebuttal testimony was inappropriate. 
Moreover, no party to the proceedings raised any objection or due process argument. 
Because the Commission has indicated that it did not properly consider Mr. 
Meredith's testimony because it was provided in rebuttal testimony, this Court should 
remand this issue to the Commission with instructions to properly consider Mr. 
Meredith's rebuttal testimony. 
B. Equitable Remedies Bar Any Challenge to Submission of Testimony in 
Rebuttal Evidence. 
The Commission's finding that Carbon/Emery's evidence presented by Mr. 
Meredith in rebuttal testimony does not constitute empirical evidence on the issue of 
return on equity because it was presented in rebuttal and not properly subjected to the 
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adversarial process is barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Utah's courts have 
(i) held that there are three elements to estoppel: 
(I) An admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted; 
(2) Action by the other party on the faith of such admission, statement or act; 
(3) Injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party to contradict 
or repudiate such admission, statement or act. 
Monarrez v. Utah DOT, 2016 UT 10,135,368 P.3d 846, 859-60. The court has added 
that "the usual rules of estoppel against" the government, and "courts must be cautious in 
applying equitable estoppel against the State." Accordingly, estoppel is applied against 
the state only "if necessary to prevent manifest injustice, and the exercise of 
governmental powers will not be impaired as a result." Id. 
In this case, the Commission admitted the rebuttal evidence of Douglas Meredith 
€i without objection from any party. Carbon/Emery relied on this admission. All parties 
• 
• 
proceeded on the basis that Mr. Meredith's evidence was admitted. Mr. Meredith was 
offered for cross examination and was subjected to cross examination. To allow the 
Commission to find that evidence offered in pre-filed rebuttal testimony under these 
circumstances, where no party has raised objection and no party has been denied the 
opportunity to address the testimony would unduly prejudice Carbon/Emery. 
Utah's Appellate court has permitted estoppel against governmental agencies in 
Utah in other contexts. See Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 602 
P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979) (estoppel was warranted because the government's clear and 
well substantiated representations were contradicted by it subsequent actions). The 
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Commission should be estopped from raising this issue when it previously admitted the 
testimony into the record. 
C. The Commission's Finding is Contrary to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-206. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-206 governs formal adjudicative proceedings at the 
Commission and provides that the presiding officer shall "regulate the course of the 
hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all parties reasonable 
opportunity to present their positions," and "shall afford to all partied the opportunity to 
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross examination, and submit rebuttal 
testimony." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-206(l)(a) and (d). Pursuant to Utah administrative 
law, Carbon/Emery was entitled to submit its rebuttal testimony; the testimony was 
admitted into the record without objection; and all parties had the opportunity to address 
the testimony in surrebuttal testimony, sur-surrebuttal testimony, and in live testimony 
and cross examination at the hearing. The Commission erred as a matter of law and this 
Court should reverse the finding of the Commission regarding the rebuttal testimony 
offered by Carbon/Emery. 
2. The Commission Erred In Imputing A Hypothetical Capital Structure Of 
43.79% Debt And 56.21 % Equity To Carbon/Emery. 
The record reflects that during the test period Carbon/Emery had no debt. R. Vol. 
2, 1906. However, all parties to the proceeding recommended the imputation of some 
debt to Carbon in calculation of the overall rate of return. The Office suggested 
imputation of 50% debt R. Vol. 2, 315. The Division and Carbon/Emery proposed 
application of a hypothetical capital structure against Carbon/Emery utilizing the method 
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developed by a taskforce appointed by the Commission in 2008. R. 39, 161; R. Vol. 2, 
e 998 at p. 163-167. In particular, as stated in the Testimony of Casey Coleman, William 
Duncan, and Douglas Meredith, both the Division and Carbon/Emery recommended 
imputation of 3 5% debt to Carbon/Emery to provide regulatory consistency to Carbon. R. 
161; R. Vol. 2,998 at p. 195; R. 1438-1440; R. 1605. As presented in the testimony by 
the Division and Carbon/Emery, in 2008 URTA petitioned the Commission for 
rulemaking on capital structure. R. 1438. Prior to 2008, the Division had used various 
Gi 
policies for capital structure including: 1) use of an "average (50/50) capital structure;" 2) 
use of the company's actual capital structure; 3) or a mixture of hypothetical and actual 
~ capital structure. R. 1438-1440. 
• 
As stated by Mr. Duncan, "rural ILEC's faced a confusing situation, never 
knowing what the 'rules' would be from case to case." R. 1439. In response to URTA's 
petition for rulemaking in Docket No. 07-999-01, the Commission formed a task force to 
study the questions related to capital structure and propose a rule to the Commission. R. 
162, 1439. The taskforce ultimately proposed a capital structure rule to the Commission. 
Id. The Commission did not adopt the rule, but stated in a letter in the docket that "the 
general parameter of the rule accompanied by the variability attempted to be included in 
the rule proposed may be applied by the Division itself in its interaction with companies." 
R. 1439, citing Docket No. 07-999-01. From that point forward, the Division has 
adopted the proposed rule as policy and has applied it consistently in its evaluation of rate 
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cases and UUSF applications since that time. R 1439-1440.3 As indicated by Mr. 
Duncan, the Division has consistently utilized the Division's "policy" on capital 
structure. R. 1440. As Casey Coleman testified such action was explicitly in some cases, 
and implicitly in other cases, condoned by the Commission. R. 864. At no time since the 
Division began using the capital structure policy in 2008 has the Commission issued any 
written order, warning or dicta that the application of the Division's policy on capital 
structure would be questioned or rejected. 
Utah law permits "relief from agency action that is 'contrary to the agency's prior 
practice' unless the agency 'gives facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency."' Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission, 
861 P.2d 414,421 (Utah 1993). Departure from the Division's policy on capital structure 
is contrary to the Commission's prior practice, and the Commission has not justified the 
3 In the Matter of the Increase in Rates of Manti Telephone Company, Docket No. 08-
046-01 (use of hypothetical 65% debt); In the Matter of Carbon/Emery Telcom 's 
Application for Increase of Rates, Docket No. 09-2302-01 (use of actual debt because it 
was between 35-65%); In the Matter of the Increase in Rates of All West 
Communications, Inc., Docket No. 11-2180-01 (use of hypothetical 65% debt); In the 
Matter of Manti Telephone Company's Application for Additional USF, Docket No. 13-
046-01 (use of hypothetical 65% debt); In the Matter of Gunnison Telephone Company's 
Application for Rate Increase, Docket No. 14-043-0l(use of hypothetical 65% equity); In 
the Matter of the Division of Public Utilities' Petition for Increased USF Distribution for 
Hanksville Te/com, Inc., Docket No. 14-2303-01 (use of 65% equity); In the Matter of 
Emery Telephone's Application for UUSF, Docket No. 14-042-01 (use of hypothetical 
65% equity); In the Matter of Emery Telephone's Application for UUSF, Docket No. 15-
042-0l(use of hypothetical 65% equity); and In the Matter of UBTA-UBET 
Communications Inc. 's application for Increase in UUSF, Docket No. 15-053-01 (use of 
actual capital structure). 
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inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
(i) inconsistency as required by Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-403. 
The Commission, in its Order on Reconsideration, says Carbon/Emery has not 
pointed to any Commission precedent establishing a standard hypothetical capital 
structure. R. 2943. The Commission states that "Carbon/Emery inaccurately construes the 
Commission's prior practice, conflating settlements with fully-litigated UUSF Cases." R. 
2943. The Court may take judicial notice of the fact that in the past 15 years, prior to the 
instant case, there was one fully litigated telecommunications UUSF case: In the Matter 
of the Increase in Rates of Manti Telephone Company, Docket No. 08-046-01. In that 
~ case, the Commission in its order adopted the Division's recommended capital structure, 
consistent with the Division's policy, as "fair and reasonable." R. 846. Thus, the entirety 
of recent fully litigated telecommunications UUSF cases, or rate cases before the 
Commission supports the use of the hypothetical capital structure promulgated by the 
task force and used by the Division. 
Additionally, Casey Coleman testified that "while it is accurate to suggest that the 
Commission was uncomfortable in having a formal rule to determine the hypothetical 
capital structure, it is also accurate to point out that the Commission has approved 
numerous rate cases where the Commission accepted the Division's policy of using a 
65/35 hypothetical capital structure." R. 864. Further, this Court can take judicial notice 
of the fact that In the Matter of the Division of Public Utilities' Petition for Increased 
USF Distribution for Hanksville Te/com, Inc., Docket No. 14-2303-01 on August 27, 
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2014 the Commission approved the use of 65% equity capital structure for Hanksville 
Telcom, a company (and affiliate of Carbon/Emery) with no debt. 
The Commission argues that approval of settlements by the Commission should 
not be conflated with fully litigated UUSF cases, however, this argument is disingenuous. 
While Carbon/Emery would agree that a black box settlement should not be conflated 
with a fully litigated matter, when the terms of a settlement approved by the Commission 
contain a particular capital structure that is consistent with the Division's policy, or an 
Order of the Commission specifically adopts the Division's proposed capital structure 
(that is consistent with Division policy) as fair and reasonable, in the absence of any other 
stated Commission rule, it is reasonable for applicants to consider this a Commission 
"practice" which would require the Commission to "give facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency." Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 
861 P.2d at 421. 
Carbon/Emery is required to establish a prima facie case that the administrative 
agency's action in its case was contrary to the agency's prior practice. According to 
Benson v. Peace Officer Standards & Training Council, 2011 UT App 220, 124, 261 
P.3d 643, 651, Carbon/Emery must prove a prima facie case of substantial prejudice by a 
preponderance of the evidence, in which case the burden then shifts to the agency to 
"'demonstrate a fair and rational basis' for the departure from precedent in the instant . 
case." Taylor v. Department of Commerce, 952 P.2d 1090, 1095 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(quoting Pickett v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
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In this instance, the Commission has refused to acknowledge its "practice" and 
ti) has, therefore, declined to offer any such facts and reasons in support for its departure 
from the practice. On the contrary, the Commission, in its Order, merely stated that "a 
public utility is obligated to provide service efficiently, including using a prudent level of 
• 
debt as a lower cost source of capital than equity. Carbon/Emery's 100% equity capital 
structure causes its weighted cost of capital to be too high." R. Vol. 2, 1912. The 
Commission then states that "we impute debt to Carbon/Emery through the use of a 
hypothetical debt/equity structure. However, we find the capital structure advocated by 
the Division and Carbon/Emery to lack evidentiary support." Id. 
This conclusion ignores the testimony of William Duncan cited above, and the 
testimony of Douglas Meredith, and errs in adopting a policy that is not consistent with 
prior practice. In addition to supporting the recommendation of the taskforce and the 
long-standing policy of the Division, Douglas Meredith also testified that imputing 35% 
debt to Carbon/Emery represents a reasonable balance of competing interests. R. Vol. 2, 
998 at p. 111. Even the Office that argued for a 50/50 capital structure did not advocate 
simply selecting a single company and imputing the capital structure of that company on 
Carbon/Emery, as the Commission ultimately did in this case. 
Despite the positions and the evidence of the Division, Carbon/Emery, and the 
Office, the Commission concluded that imputing a hypothetical capital structure of 
43.79% debt to Carbon/Emery is just and reasonable. 
Utah Admin. Code § R 7 46-100-11.F( 1) requires that a party asking the 
Commission to review the evidence that supports the challenged finding, as set forth in 
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State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, ifil 33-44. 326 P.3d 645, 651-53. The Court in State v. 
Nielsen held: 
Id. 
From here on our analysis will be focused on the ultimate question of 
whether the appellant has established a basis for overcoming the healthy 
dose of deference owed to factual findings and jury verdicts-and not on 
whether there is a technical deficiency in marshaling meriting a default. 
To meet Carbon/Emery's burden of persuasion on appeal, in reaching its 
conclusion on capital structure the Commission likely relied on the testimony offered by 
the Office's witness, David Brevitz. Mr. Brevitz testified that Carbon/Emery (and the 
Division's) request for a hypothetical capital structure of 35% debt and 65% equity was 
imbalanced in favor of Carbon/Emery, and against the statewide base of consumers that 
pays in to support the UUSF. R. 1977-1979. Mr. Brevitz stated that "competitive firms 
seek to optimize capital structure to provide the lowest overall weighed cost of capital." 
R. 1977. Mr. Brevitz testified that "Carbon/Emery's revenues and cash flows are stable, 
and thus it has ample room to leverage its capital structure and reduce its overall required 
rate of return. As a public utility, Carbon/Emery is able to borrow at low cost from 
entities such as CoBank." R. 1978. Mr. Brevitz testified that assuming only 35% debt in 
the capital structure unreasonably and artificially raises the overall rate of return 
requested by Carbon/Emery. R. 1978. Mr. Brevitz also testified that "this case is a 
perfect example of why using such a rule, or 65% equity assumption has an impact in 
ratemaking settings that are [sic]contrary to the public interest." R. 1979. Mr. Brevitz 
identifies the debt ratios taken from six publicly traded companies which he states "are 
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often and regularly used as 'comparable companies' for purposes of rate of return 
~ analysis for rural telephone companies in state universal service fund proceedings." R. 
1979 
% Long Term Debt to total Capital 
2013 2014 
Alaska Communications (ALSK) 76.80% 75.60% 
Century Link ( CTL) 54.00% 57.30% 
Consolidated Communications (CNSL) 89.00% 81.00% 
Frontier Communications (FTR) 66.00% 72.17% 
Shenandoah Telecom (SHEN) 48.91% 43.79% 
Windstream (WIN) 91.10% 97.25% 
Average 70.97% 71.19% 
R. 1979. From this data, Mr. Brevitz recommended a 50/50 capital structure. R. 1979. 
Douglas Meredith testified that Mr. Brevitz comparison of large companies is 
unconvincing and noted that "only [Shenandoah] is relatively 'close' to the size of 
Carbon/Emery and it has 43 percent debt." R. 1605. 
From this testimony, the Commission selected Shenandoah as the company whose 
debt ratio Carbon/Emery should mirror, even though there was no evidence offered by 
Ci> any party to support the selection of one random company upon which to base the capital 
structure debt imputation. In reaching this conclusion the Commission stated "the Office 
has presented evidence that it is generally easier and more affordable for a utility such as 
Carbon/Emery to find a lender, as opposed to finding public investors." R. Vol. 2, 1911. 
Further, "according to the Office's data, companies that are at least somewhat similar to 
Carbon/Emery typically had debt ratio of at least 43. 79% during the test year, and at least 
one similar company had a debt ratio of 97 .25%." Id. 
• 
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It is important to note that Carbon/Emery is not arguing that the Commission erred 
in imputing some level of debt to Carbon/Emery. Rather, Carbon/Emery takes issue with 
the selection of the debt percentage to be imputed and the method of its selection, and the 
departure from existing Commission practices. The Commission stated "the Office's 
data shows that reasonably comparably non-subsidized telecom companies had debt 
positions of at least 43. 79% during the test year and that Carbon/Emery had a very 
similar debt position of 41.86%" in its 2009 docket. Accordingly, we find a hypothetical 
capital structure of 43.79% debt and 56.21 % equity to be just and reasonable." R. Vol. 2, 
1912. 
The Commission did not provide any distinguishing fact or reason to justify a fair 
and rational basis for not affording Carbon/Emery the same treatment that other regulated 
telephone companies have received since 2008. As stated above, Commission's finding 
on a capital structure of 43.79% debt is not supported by substantial evidence and should 
be reversed by this court and remanded to the Commission. 
More importantly, however, the Commission's finding on capital structure in 
Carbon/Emery's case does not identify any standard or any method regarding capital 
structure that would offer any precedential value or regulatory guidance to Carbon/Emery 
( or any telecommunications company) seeking Universal Service Funds in the future. 
The next time Carbon/Emery seeks to file a Universal Service Fund Application should it 
look at Shenandoah Telecom and mirror Shenandoah's current capital structure at the 
time of filing its application? Of course, that would be an absurd result. Or is the 
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Commission saying that in all instances going forward, it will impute 43. 79% debt to 
(i) Carbon/Emery regardless of Carbon/Emery's actual debt? Unlikely.4 
Adopting the capital structure for Carbon/Emery based on one single telecom 
company, without identifying any method or standard for that selection will require 
Carbon/Emery to litigate the capital structure issue each and every time it seeks a rate 
increase or a distribution from the USF. This is not a just and reasonable result, and will 
only serve to increase litigation costs and expenses for the company, the Commission, the 
Division and the Office. This decision is arbitrary and capricious and is not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Moreover, Utah law requires that "as necessary to accomplish the purpose of this 
section, the fund shall provide a mechanism for specific, predictable and sufficient funds . 
. . " Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15(9). Additionally, the Public Service Commission was 
required "to establish rules governing the administration of the fund" and have a bill 
prepared for the 1998 General Session of the Legislature "to place in statute as much of 
the regulation implemented by rule pursuant to the act the commission believes is 
practicable." Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-15(3) and (13 ). 
To the extent that the Commission has consistently failed and refused to articulate 
any standards on capital structure, which is an integral part of the rate of return 
calculation, the Commission should not be permitted to depart from prior practice 
without articulating specific facts and reasons. Further, if the Commission is going to 
®> 4 The absurdity of the Commission's approach is illustrated by the fact that the debt 
structure of Shenandoah was only 32% at the end of 2015, according to Yahoo! Finance. 
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depart from standard practice, it should be required to adopt a capital structure imputation 
that articulates a standard, and provides guidance to Carbon/Emery going forward. To do 
otherwise, as the Commission has done here, is arbitrary and capricious and this Court 
should remand this issue back to the Commission to articulate appropriate facts, and 
establish a proper standard for its selection of the imputed capital structure. 
3. The Commission Erred In Determining The Appropriate Depreciation 
Expense For Carbon/Emery During The Test Period. 
Carbon/Emery uses the FCC prescribed Uniform System of Accounts contained in 
47 CFR Part 32. R. 57. Carbon/Emery has, since its inception as a company, calculated 
its depreciation expense using a straight-line calculation using a group plan of 
accounting. R. 1147; R. Vol. 2, 40-41; R. 596-624. Carbon/Emery applies the 
depreciation rates as set by the Commission in Docket 05-2303-01 to its group accounts. 
R. 146, 1612. 
Using the group asset method of depreciation that Carbon/Emery has employed 
since its inception, Carbon/Emery's CFO Darren Woolsey calculated Carbon/Emery's 
depreciation expense for purposes of Carbon/Emery's USF Application. R. Vol. 1, 203. 
Mr. Woolsey and Mr. Meredith testified that Carbon/Emery's depreciation expense 
number for the test year is representative of the depreciation expense the company will 
experience in the next five years. R. Vol. 2, 998 at pp. 22 and 115. 
The Division resisted Carbon/Emery's group method of depreciation because the 
Division claimed that Group Depreciation as currently used by Carbon/Emery modified 
the Commission approved rates of depreciation. R. 143. Specifically, the Division 
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testified that the Commission approved certain rates of depreciation, but Carbon/Emery's 
i) use of group asset depreciation results in assets being depreciated faster than the rate 
approved by the Commission, resulting in a mismatch between the depreciation expense 
and the asset lives. R. 145-146. 
To combat this, the Division identified five acceptable methods of depreciation, 
and suggested a depreciation expense reduction, based on a single asset straight-line 
method of depreciation. R. 148. Carbon/Emery resisted the elimination of the group 
method of depreciation as being contrary to FCC Part 32, and proposed application of the 
FCC Method of depreciation identified by Mr. Hellewell in his Direct Testimony. The 
~ FCC Method of depreciation recalculates the group depreciation rate based on the plants 
average remaining life, future net salvage value, and depreciation reserve ratios. R. 149. 
In Mr. Woolsey's Sur-surrebuttal Testimony, Carbon/Emery recalculated its test 
year depreciation expense utilizing the FCC Method, which resulted in a test year 
depreciation expense similar to that contained in Carbon/Emery's application. R. Vol. 2, 
370. The Division did not calculate the depreciation expense using the FCC Method. R. 
Vol. 2, 998, at p. 220. Rather, in Mr. Hellewell's Sur-surrebuttal testimony, the Division 
used a vintage method of depreciation, and calculated the test year depreciation expense 
adjustment at . R. Vol. 2, 773. The Commission adopted the depreciation 
expense adjustment calculated by the Division using the vintage method for the test 
period. R. Vol. 2, 1920. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4, "if in the Commission's determination of 
just and reasonable rates the commission uses a test period, the commission shall select a 
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test period that, based on evidence, the commission finds best reflects the conditions that 
a public utility will encounter during the period when the rates determined by the 
commission will be in effect." As suggested by Carbon/Emery, and agreed to by the 
Division and the Office, the Commission established 2014 as the effective test year. 
Carbon/Emery is not requesting review of the Commission's determination of the test 
year. Rather, Carbon/Emery is seeking review of the depreciation expense adjustment to 
the test year adopted by the Commission. 
It is a fundamental goal of rate making to select a test year and adjust it for known 
and measurable changes such that it reasonably approximates the rate-effective period. 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 861 P.2d at 422, citing Utah Dep't of Business Reg. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 614 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Utah 1980); see City & County of San Francisco v. 
Public Util. Comm'n, 703 P.2d 381,387 (Cal. 1985) (en bane); L.S. Ayres & Co. v. 
Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 351 N.E.2d 814, 828-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). Implicit 
in the Commission's adoption of the Division's depreciation expense adjustment to the 
test year is the Commission's determination that the test period with the depreciation 
expense adjustment adopted by the Commission reasonably approximates the effective 
period of Carbon/Emery's UUSF request, as required by Utah law. This implicit 
conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
Further, while both the Division and the Commission state that it is a fundamental 
ratemaking principal that, generally, an asset's depreciable life should match-as closely 
as practicable-its actual service life (R. Vol. 2, 1918), the evidence in this case does not 
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support a finding that the Commission adopted depreciation method ensures that 
Carbon/Emery's assets' depreciable lives match their actual service lives. 
In an effort to meet its marshaling obligation, Carbon/Emery has reviewed the 
testimony in this case for evidence that supports: (1) the Commission's implicit finding 
that test year, as adjusted by the Commission reasonably approximates the effective 
period of Carbon/Emery's UUSF request; and (2) that the Commission's depreciation 
method accomplishes the fundamental ratemaking principal that, generally, an asset's 
depreciable life should match-as closely as practicable-its actual service life. R. Vol. 
2, 1918. It was a difficult task. 
In support of the finding that the Commission's depreciation method appropriately 
matches the depreciable lives of Carbon/Emery's assets with their actual remaining life, 
the Commission likely relied on the testimony of the Division Witness Mr. Hellewell, 
who stated that "the Division's calculation for depreciation expense was calculated this 
way [ single asset straight-line] for the purpose of reaching a reasonable depreciation 
expense that would match actual diminution in value during the test year without rapidly 
accelerated depreciation." R. Vol. 2, 766-767. Further, during the hearing, Mr. Hellewell 
was asked about the Division's depreciation expense adjustment and reiterated that the 
Division's depreciation expense was simply an adjustment of an unreasonably inflated 
depreciation expense to a reasonable depreciation expense that better matches the actual 
diminution in value of Carbon's assets during the test year. R. Vol. 2,998 at pp. 214-215. 
As further support for the finding the Commission's chosen method of 
depreciation matches depreciable lives with actual remaining lives, the Commission may 
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have relied upon Mr. Hellewell's testimony regarding the Group-Vintage Method of 
depreciation. Mr. Hellewell testified that "vintage depreciation would allow for assets 
capitalized within a certain date range to be grouped and depreciated together, any new 
assets purchased outside that date range would then be placed in a new group. Groups 
would then be depreciated using a straight-line method until the group is fully 
depreciated. Once fully depreciated, if still used and useful, the group would remain 
intact and no further depreciation expense would be generated .... The clear benefit of 
vintage groups is the significant reduction in the variation between depreciable life and 
actual asset useful life." R. Vol. 2, 770-771. 
However, reliance on that testimony would have been inappropriate because, 
while the Division claims that the purpose for making its depreciation adjustment was to 
match the actual diminution of value of Carbon/Emery's assets, Mr. Hellewell testified 
during cross examination, that the Division does not know what the actual diminution of 
value of Carbon's assets was during the test period, and in fact, as discussed above, 
neither the Division nor the Office examined the plant or facilities at Carbon/Emery to 
enable it to determine the condition of the plant or the actual remaining life of the plant. 
R. Vol. 2, 998 at pp. 53 and 216. Further, the record is devoid of any testimony showing 
that the vintage method, as employed by the Division and the Commission actually 
reduced the variation between the depreciable life and the actual asset useful life because, 
as set forth above, there is no testimony showing a calculation of the actual useful 
remaining life of the assets grouped together in the Commission's chosen vintage 
method. Thus, the record is lacking evidentiary support for the Commission's conclusion 
41 
• 
that the vintage method as applied reduces the variation between the depreciable life and 
• the actual asset useful life. 
The Commission in its Order on Reconsideration states that it is not necessary to 
inspect the plant or approximate the remaining value of Carbon/Emery's assets, because 
the depreciable lives of those assets have been established by prior Commission order. R. 
2948. This statement demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding regarding 
depreciation and the purpose for which depreciation is used. While the Commission is 
correct that the Commission sets the depreciation rates by order, the depreciation rates set 
by the Commission identify the depreciable lives of the assets, but they do not take into 
• consideration the remaining useful life of an asset. For example, the Commission may 
set the depreciation rate of vehicles at 20%. This means that a vehicle has a depreciable 
life of 5 years. However, a vehicle may remain in service, with useful life, longer than 
five years. Therefore, an analysis of both an asset's depreciation rate and its actual 
remaining useful life is required. The method of deprecation selected by the Commission 
did not utilize a calculation of actual remaining useful lives. 
• 
The Division glosses over this point and testifies that "determining how large the 
vintages should be remains a question that will produce varied results. A one year 
vintage would produce depreciation expense similar to single-asset depreciation; groups 
with too wide a date range would accelerate depreciation expense on new assets similar 
to Carbon/Emery's current groups." R. Vol. 2, 772. To address these issues, the Division 
applied a flat percentage of 20% against the current depreciable life of the asset group to 
determine the appropriate "vintage." Id. According to the Division, this method results in 
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one year vintages for vehicles, which normally have a 5 year life; and 4 year vintages for 
assets like buried cable or buildings that normally have a 20 year life. Id. The Division 
then configured " the vintage groups to allow each unit in its group to reach its 
depreciable life within the group timeline." Id. The Division testified in a conclusory 
fashion that utilizing this method "there would be no spikes in depreciation expense at the 
end of the group's depreciable life, and no acceleration; each year would be reasonably 
representative of the future and past years." R. Vol. 2, 773. However, as demonstrated 
below, Mr. Hellewell admits that the depreciation expense suggested by the Division, and 
adopted by the Commission is not reasonably representative of the future and past years. 
With regard to the implicit decision made by the Commission that the test year, 
with the depreciation expense adjustment adopted by the Commission reasonably 
approximates the effective period of the UUSF, there is no support for this finding in the 
record. As demonstrated above, while Mr. Hellewell testifies that under the Group 
Vintage method "each year would be reasonably representative of the future and past 
years," (R. Vol. 2, 773), when asked specifically about the years in the period to be 
reasonably covered by Carbon/Emery's UUSF request, Mr. Hellewell testified that the 
Division's depreciation expense adjustment is not representative of the depreciation 
expense going forward and that the depreciation expense of Carbon/Emery would 
continue to increase for at least five years. R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 209- 212. There simply is 
no testimony that the depreciation expense adjustment of-as adopted by the 
Commission is a reasonable approximation of the depreciation expense that 
Carbon/Emery will have during the effective period of the UUSF request. 
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On the contrary, Darren Woolsey has provided substantial testimony that the 
Commission's adopted depreciation expense does not project a representative test period. 
R. Vol. 2, 359-363.The undisputed testimony is that the Carbon/Emery depreciation 
expense for subsequent years ( at least through 2019) will be higher than that proposed by 
the Division for the test period R. Vol. 2, 362; Vol. 2, 998 at p. 44-45. Thus, while the 
using the Division's suggested method of depreciation may result in a depreciation 
expense adjustment for the test year, the inquiry cannot end there. Under Utah law, the 
test year, as adjusted by the Commission, must result in a test year that reasonably 
approximates the effective period of the UUSF request. 
The Commission minimizes this legal requirement by stating that "it was 
incumbent upon Carbon/Emery to choose a test year that would be representative of the 
anticipated effective period." R. 294 7. The Commission cites the argument presented by 
the Division which is that "had Carbon/Emery concluded that an adjusted 2014 test year 
was not representative of the rate effective period, it should have chosen to use another 
test period." This argument fails to appreciate the fact that the test year selected by 
Carbon/Emery, with the depreciation expense identified by Carbon/Emery in said test 
year, was representative of the rate effective period until the Commission adopted the 
inappropriate depreciation expense adjustment. In other words, it was the adoption of the 
Group Vintage Depreciation method that resulted in 2014 's "adjusted" depreciation 
expense not being representative of the rate effective period in violation of Utah law. 
Additionally, with regard to depreciation expense, if the Commission's goal is 
actually to match the assets depreciable lives with the actual service lives, as indicated in 
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the Commission's Order, the only depreciation method in the record that included a 
calculation of the remaining useful lives of the assets is the FCC Method as calculated by 
Carbon/Emery in its Sur-Surrebuttal Testimony. R. Vol. 2, p. 370. Mr. Woolsey 
provided a calculation of the remaining useful lives of the assets and there is no evidence 
presented in this case disputing that calculation. 
While all methods of depreciation are approximations of the diminution of value 
of the assets, the FCC Method which resembles Carbon/Emery's chosen depreciation 
· method with adjustment for actual remaining lives, will yield the best approximation of 
the actual diminution of value of Carbon/Emery's assets without creating an artificial 
distortion by changing the depreciation method in the middle of the life of the asset 
group. Further, the FCC method is consistent with Utah Code which requires an 
approximation of the actual diminution of value of the assets. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-
12.1 provides: 
In determining depreciation expense of a telephone corporation in any 
proceeding under Section 54-7-12, the Commission shall consider all 
reasonable factors, including the alteration of asset lives to better reflect 
changes in the economic life of plant and equipment used to provide 
telecommunications services. 5 
The FCC Method also addresses the concerns that the Commission has about matching 
depreciation lives with actual remaining service lives, whereas, the vintage method 
adopted by the Commission, as calculated by the Division is arbitrary in its use of a 20 
5 The Commission, in its Order, FN 11, states that this is not a proceeding under § 54-7-
12, however, the Commission can take judicial notice of the fact that the Commission has 
routinely looked to the statutes governing rate cases for instruction in UUSF proceedings. 
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percent adjustment factor, and does not consider the actual remaining lives of the asset 
<i> groups. 
• 
The Commission states in its Order on Reconsideration that Carbon/Emery's 
failed to make its argument in pre-hearing testimony or at trial that Utah law requires and 
approximation of the actual diminution of value of assets, and that the FCC Method of 
depreciation calculates this while the vintage method does not. R. 2948. As a result, the 
Commission states that this argument is not subject to consideration on review. R. 2948. 
This is not accurate. First, as indicated above, the Division witness, Mr. Hellewell, 
identified the "diminution in value" argument in his Sur-surrebuttal Testimony. R. 766-
767. Additionally, Carbon/Emery made this argument in its Post-Hearing Closing 
Argument. R. 2711. As the Court is aware, unless a party makes a motion for summary 
judgment on a particular issue, or a court requires prehearing briefing, there is typically 
no opportunity for argument until the closing argument at the end of hearing. In this case 
the Commission did not require pre-hearing briefing, and Carbon/Emery did not file for 
summary judgment on this issue6, therefore, Carbon/Emery appropriately raised these 
arguments in its Post-Hearing Closing Brief, and the issues are subject to consideration 
on review. 
(ii) 6 While Carbon/Emery did make a motion for summary judgment on depreciation issues, 
Carbon/Emery's motion was limited to a different discrete issue. 
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4. The Commission Failed to Determine Whether Carbon/Emery Selection Of 
The Group Method Of Accounting Was Imprudent When The Company 
Implemented Group Asset Accounting. 
Depreciation expense is directly related to rate base. As assets are depreciated, 
they are removed from rate base and a company no longer earns a return on those assets. 
Darren Woolsey for Carbon/Emery explained that "depreciation effects rate of return 
calculations in two ways: first by the depreciation expense recorded in any given period; 
and second by the allowed rate of return applied to the [net book value] of these 
associated assets." R. Vol. 2, 43. Therefore, when a depreciation adjustment is made, it 
necessarily and reasonably has an impact on rate base. As the evidence in the record 
demonstrates, Carbon/Emery selected the group method of depreciation with its 
correlating effect on rate base and applied it continuously since the company's inception 
with no modifications or challenge from the Commission until this UUSF proceeding. 
The Commission in this order adjusted the deprecation expense from the time the 
assets were placed in service, but did not adjust the rate base for the same corresponding 
period. There simply was no way the Carbon/Emery CEO could have foreseen in 2001, 
when the decision to use group depreciation was made, that the Commission would 
implement a change in depreciation method in a manner that would disrupt the 
relationship between depreciation expense and rate base. The Commission cannot 
determine that the company's use of group depreciation and corresponding depreciation 
expense was imprudent and unreasonable because it resulted in excessive depreciation 
expense since the time the assets were placed in service, but that the rate base for the 
same time period was not unreasonable or imprudent. The depreciation expense in this 
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instance necessarily results from the decision to use group depreciation and is integrally 
i) tied to the rate base calculation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(4) provides, in pertinent part: 
If in the Commission's determination of just, reasonable or sufficient rates, the 
Commission considers the prudence of an action taken by a public utility, or an 
expense incurred by a public utility, the Commission shall apply the following 
standard in making its prudence determination: 
(i) Ensure just and reasonable rates for the retail ratepayers of the public utility 
in this state; 
(ii) focus on the reasonableness of the expense resulting from the action of the 
public utility judged as of the time the action was taken; 
(iii) determine whether a reasonable utility, knowing what the utility knew or 
reasonably should have known at the time of the action, would reasonably 
have incurred all or some portion of the expense, in taking the same or 
some other prudent action. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Commission did not do this when it adjusted the depreciation of the assets 
from the time they were placed in service (in many instances many years ago), but did 
not adjust the rate base for the same corresponding period. This was an error of law. 
At the outset, the Commission argues that this issue was not timely raised because 
{I) Carbon/Emery first raised this argument in its Post-Hearing Closing Brief. As indicated 
above, in a UUSF ( or rate case) proceeding before the Commission, the parties rarely 
have the opportunity to raise legal arguments until closing argument. The Commission 
acknowledges that Carbon/Emery raised this argument in its Post-Hearing Closing 
Argument, so as a matter of law, the Commission's determination that this issue was not 
timely raised is in error. 
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The Commission also argues that Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4( 4) applies to the fixing 
of rates, which is not at issue in this case. While the Commission is correct that this 
section of Utah Code applies to classification and fixing of rates, the section is instructive 
on fixing the amount of a UUSF distribution, particularly where the Commission doing 
the same analysis of a company's expenses as it would in a rate case. The fact is that 
many of the rules, practices, and procedures that apply specifically to rate cases are 
instructive in the UUSF inquiry, and this code section is no exception. Utah Code Ann. § 
54-4-4( 4) seeks to avoid unfair "after the fact" criticism of decisions made by the utility, 
by requiring that the prudence of a utility company's action should be judged based on 
the facts in the possession of the utility company at the time the decision was made. 
Carbon/Emery thinks this same logic can, and should, apply in a UUSF case. 
Next, the Commission argues that Carbon/Emery has not provided the 
Commission the facts and circumstances it now claims the Commission must consider. R. 
2953. This is not accurate. As demonstrated above, Carbon/Emery identified several facts 
and factors considered by Carbon/Emery to be relevant to this issue. In particular, 
Carbon/Emery testified that it carefully selected the method of depreciation - group asset 
depreciation-in 2001 (R. Vol. 2, 998 at p. 25); that its use of the group method of 
depreciation is permitted by 47 CPR Part 32 and used in its interstate operations. R. Vol. 
2, 998 at p. 24-25. Carbon/Emery testified that application of the group method results in 
a depreciation expense that is consistent with the FCC Method (R. Vol. 2, 370-371) 
which the Division has testified is an acceptable method of depreciation. R. 149. Finally, 
Darren Woolsey testified that the correct application of a corrective method of 
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depreciation necessarily requires adjustments to depreciation expense and rate base for 
a the same corresponding period. R. Vol. 2, 46-4 7. 
In short, the prudence of Carbon/Emery's choice to use the group method and its 
resulting depreciation expense and rate base calculation must, pursuant to Utah law, be 
judged at the time the action was taken, knowing what the company knew or reasonably 
should have known at the time. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4( 4 ). If the decision on 
depreciation methods and the resulting depreciation expense and rate base calculation 
were prudent when made, the Commission should not require retroactive application of a 
new depreciation method. If the depreciation method and resulting depreciation expense 
• and rate base calculation were imprudent when made, the Commission should make 
adjustments to both depreciation expense and rate base calculation for the same 
corresponding periods-which it did not do. Finally, if the Commission wants to modify 
the depreciation method going forward, it should apply the new depreciation method 
prospectively so the company is not penalized for its previous "action." 
The Commission stated in its Order that: 
The question under Section 54-4-4( 4)(a)(iii) would not be whether 
Carbon/Emery carefully considered whether to circumvent its Commission-
ordered depreciation schedules. The question would be whether 
Carbon/Emery knew or should have known that the Commission had issued 
an order setting its depreciable lives. Carbon/Emery has not argued that it 
was unaware of the Commission's order. 
R. 2954. 
This statement is problematic. Carbon/Emery did not disregard the Commission's 
order on depreciation rates. Rather, Carbon/Emery has testified that it applies the 
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Commission ordered depreciation rates to its group accounts. R. Vol. 2, 40-41; R. 596-
624. The "action" taken by Carbon/Emery which the Commission is required to judge, as 
of the time the action was taken, was Carbon/Emery's identification of its group accounts 
and its implementation of the group method of depreciation and resulting depreciation 
expense and rate base calculations. 
Carbon/Emery identified its group accounts pursuant to 4 7 CPR Part 32 in 2001. 
Since that time, it has had no reason to depart from such accounts, and it had no 
indication from the Commission that such accounts should be modified. On the contrary, 
Carbon/Emery relied on its chosen method of depreciation to provide a stable predictable 
depreciation expense used by management to forecast and plan capital expenditures and 
operations. There simply is no evidence to suggest that Carbon/Emery's choice of 
method of depreciation was imprudent when made and the Commission has made- no 
such finding consistent with Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should correct the Commission's 
procedural errors related to testimony offered in rebuttal; preservation of the record; and 
timely raising of issues. Further, the Commission's findings in the Order on Review, 
Rehearing and Reconsideration on cost of equity, depreciation expense, and capital 
structure should be reversed and remanded to the Public Service Commission. 
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